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COMMENTS
THE HALFWAY POINT BETWEEN
BARBARY COAST AND SHANGRI-LA:
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE
VIABILITY OF THE ECONOMIC REALITY
METHOD POST-PARKCENTRAL GLOBAL HUB
LTD. V PORSCHE AUTOMOBILE HOLDINGS SE
KAITLIN A. BRUNO*
In the increasingly globalized world, courts have struggled with how to best
determine whether a security transaction is sufficiently domestic for § 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to apply. The leader in securities
regulation jurisprudence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held in Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings
SE that, although satisfying the location-based transactional test the Supreme
Court established in Morrison v. National Australia Bank is required, it is
not, on its own, dispositive of § 10(b) liability.
This Comment argues that post-Parkcentral courts should use a new, two-
step test to analyze the extraterritoriality of securities transactions. Courts
should first perform the Morrison transactional test followed by the sufficiency
test the Second Circuit established in Parkcentral. In so doing, courts should
evaluate a variety of factors and, based on the totality of the circumstances,
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determine whether § 10(b) applies. The test advocated by this Comment will
strengthen Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality by providing
courts with more tools to analyze cases with foreign elements.
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INTRODUCTION
In the increasingly globalized world, will the United States become
the Barbary Coast for securities transactions where fraudsters easily
flout U.S. securities regulations by finding holes in the law's
narrow interpretation? Or will the United States become a
Shangri-La where foreign plaintiffs who claim fraud on the foreign
securities market flock to U.S. courts, despite their cases having
little actual connection to the United States?
Since the 1970s, U.S. courts have been trying to find a balance
between the two extremes in U.S. securities regulation. In the
seminal case Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,' the Supreme
Court ruled that § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)' has no extraterritorial reach.3 Courts must perform
a location-based transactional test to determine whether the
transaction is sufficiently domestic to incur § 10(b) liability.
However, with the growing prevalence of globalization and modern
technology, that line is increasingly harder to draw. Securities
markets can now operate fluidly across international borders with
many parties conducting their transactions electronically.' Some
security instruments, like securities-based swap agreements or
American Depositary Receipts, can have attenuated connections to
the location of the transaction.' Due to this trend, courts have
struggled to create a clear but flexible rule that can adequately
address the variety of securities instruments.
In the summer of 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the leader in securities regulation jurisprudence,7 made an
1. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
2. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)
(prohibiting fraud in any transaction of regulated securities).
3. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 (explaining that § 10(b) does not overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality).
4. See id. at 267, 269-70 (outlining two factors for determining liability: (1)
whether the transaction is conducted in the United States, or (2) whether it involves
a security listed on a domestic exchange).
5. See Second Circuit Holds that Transactions in Unlisted Securities Are Domestic if
Irrevocable Liability Is Incurred or if Title Passes Within the United States, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1430, 1436 n.56 (2013) [hereinafter Second Circuit Holds Transactions Domestic]
(noting that over-the-counter securities transactions are conducted electronically and
over the telephone).
6. See id. at 1436 (speculating that the Absolute Activist domestic transaction test could still
lead to inconsistencies because transaction location is arbitany for some types of securities).
7. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 260 (remarking that, although the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit criticized the U.S. Court of Appeals for
437
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important step towards finding that middle ground. Parkcentral Global
Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings SE' was a § 10(b) case
regarding securities-backed swap agreements' where the underlying
security was foreign." The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York used the economic reality method to determine
that § 10(b) did not cover plaintiffs' claims." In affirming the district
court, the Second Circuit approached the issue differently,
addressing the issue of whether the transactional test controlled."
The court ultimately diverged from the bright-line traditional
understanding of the transactional test," holding that, even if the
plaintiffs had satisfied the Morrison transactional test, the transaction
lacked a sufficient connection to the United States to satisfy § 10(b)."
With its holding in Parkcentral, the Second Circuit created a major
shift in extraterritorial considerations in securities law
jurisprudence.' No longer can courts rely solely on the transactional
test to determine whether a case can be brought under § 10(b). The
Parkcentral court, however, left some issues unresolved.' Most
the Second Circuit's conduct-and-effects test, it felt obligated to defer to the court's
accepted expertise); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762
(1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to the Second Circuit as the "Mother
Court" of securities law); SEC v. A Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905,
917 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (applying the Second Circuit's domestic transaction test from
Absolute Activist to the facts of the case); Richard A. Grossmann, The Trouble with Dicta:
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Securities Act, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 349, 355
(2013) (speculating that the Second Circuit's domestic transaction test will become
the standard because of the court's renowned expertise in securities law).
8. 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
9. See id. at 201, 205 (explaining that the securities-based swap agreement was a
contract where plaintiffs and a third party agreed to exchange money depending on
the price of Volkswagen shares, which were traded on foreign exchanges).
10. Id.at201.
11. Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476-77
(S.D.N.Y 2010), affd sub nom. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d 198.
12. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 214-16.
13. See id. at 215-16; see also Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens
CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (characterizing
Morrison as adopting a bright-line test); Christopher Calfee, Can't See the Forest for the Tnes:
Where Does a Purchase or Sale of Securities Occur, 2AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 153, 154 (2012) (same);
Second Circuit Holds Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at 1430 (same).
14. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216.
15. See infra Part I.B.2 (explaining that Parkcentral held courts could no longer
solely rely on the transactional test to determine whether § 10(b) applied).
16. See So Much for Bright-Line Tests on Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Securities Laws?,
PROSKAIJER (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-
alert/so-much-for-bright-line-tests-on-extraterritorial-reach-of-us-securities-laws
(listing several "intriguing questions" raised by Parkcentral, including how much
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importantly, the Parkcentral court did not clarify the specific test courts
must use to determine when a case is sufficiently domestic to warrant §
10(b) liability." The Second Circuit indicated courts would analyze a
variety of factors but left it to future courts and cases to devise the
specifics of the test. Moreover, the court did not comment on how
the economic reality method would fit into this analysis, if at all.
This Comment will argue that the economic reality method is still
viable after Parkcentral, but that it now constitutes one of the factors
of the sufficiency analysis rather than its previous use under the
transactional test. This Comment proposes a framework for the new
extraterritorial inquiry based on Parkcentrals holding. Courts should
now perform the Morrison transactional test and then analyze a variety of
factors based on the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
case is sufficiently domestic to incur § 10(b) liability. One of these
factors will be the economic reality of the security instrument
Part I describes the development of the § 10(b) jurisprudence
regarding extraterritoriality. This Comment begins by briefly
explaining the creation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
and the structure of § 10(b). Then, the Comment maps the
development of the § 10(b) extraterritoriality case law. Part I ends by
examining the recent developments under Parkcentral. Part I goes
on to address the implications of Parkcentrats holding. The
Comment proposes a structure for the new sufficiency analysis and
explains how it adheres to Morrison. This Comment argues this new
structure is not an attempted return to the previously overruled
conduct-and-effects test. Next, the Comment explains how the
economic reality method is still viable post-Parkcentral nd how the
method should be used as part of the sufficiency analysis. Finally, this
Comment argues that the proposed structure of this new test
reconciles the previous issues under the strict transactional test.
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of Section 10(b)'s Extraterritorialityjurisprudence
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the use of
manipulative or deceptive devices "in connection with the purchase
leeway the court created to allow consideration of other factors in the transaction's
nature to determine whether it is foreign or domestic).
17. See Parkcentra4 763 F.3d at 217 (noting that courts in future cases would need
to examine the facts of each case to eventually develop a test).
18. Id.
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or sale of any security."" The Exchange Act makes no reference in §
10(b) to whether the provision applies extraterritorially.20 Courts
originally decided on an ad hoc basis whether the statute applied to a
particular case with foreign elements using a conduct-and-effects
test.21 Courts examined the level of fraudulent conduct in the United
States and the effect the fraud had on U.S. investors." The U.S.
Supreme Court decidedly rejected this approach in Morrison and held
that the Exchange Act did not apply extraterritorially." Morrison
required courts to apply the two-prong transaction test to determine
whether a case has enough domestic elements to fall under § 10(b)."
Since Morrison, the lower courts have refined the definition of each
prong of the transactional test." Section 10(b) jurisprudence shifted
after the 2014 Second Circuit decision in Parkcentral, which held the
transactional test was no longer sufficient to incur § 10(b) liability.
1. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress passed the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Exchange Act created the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and along with the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act), established the foundations of modern
federal securities regulation in the United States. Congress passed
the Exchange Act to protect investors from fraudulent and
manipulative practices and to ensure stability and confidence in the
securities markets." Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is the most
prominent anti-fraud provision. The provision makes it unlawful:
19. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
20. See Morrison v. Nat'I Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264-65 (2010) (holding
that the lack of affirmative indication from Congress that § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act applies extraterritorially means that it does not).
21. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
206, 209 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247.
22. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 256-58; Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334; Sdenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206,209.
23. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264-65.
24. Id. at 267.
25. See, e.g., City of Pontiac Policemen's & Firemen's Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752
F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting the "listing theory" for Morrison's first prong);
Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012)
(concluding that parties must obtain irrevocable liability or transfer title in the
United States to satisfy Morrison's second prong); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec.
Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that cross-listed securities do
not meet the first prong of Morrison).
26. See generally MARc I. STEINBERG, SECURITIEs REGULATION 463 (6th ed. 2013)
(providing a general overview of the Exchange Act and § 10(b)); Second Circuit Holds
[Vol. 65:435440
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[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security ... or any securities-based swap agreement[,] any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.17
Though not specifically stated in the Act, courts have held that
private litigants have an implied right of action under § 10(b).28
Private plaintiffs must have been purchasers or sellers of the security
and demonstrate such elements as materiality, scienter, reliance, and
causation.29 Defendants can be the other party to the security
transaction or another entity that committed a fraud in connection
with the security transaction.o Section 10(b) is a "catch-all" provision
that Congress devised to cover a broad range of activity and
securities."' Since the law's enactment, courts have refined and
managed the parameters of § 10(b).
2. The conduct-and-effects est
For decades after Congress promulgated the Exchange Act, courts
struggled to determine § 10(b) anti-fraud liability in cases with
extraterritorial elements. Courts, led by the Second Circuit,
eventually established the conduct-and-effects test in Schoenbaum v.
Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at 1434 ("[T] he Exchange Act is at its core a remedial
statute designed to protect investors and the integrity of U.S. securities markets, as well as
to provide adequate deterrence and compensation for fraud .... ).
27. Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 209
(2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)).
28. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (noting
that courts have consistently recognized a private right of action for § 10(b) for more
than thirty-five years); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa.
1946) (holding that there was an implied private right of action for investors involved in a
deceptive purchase of stock in a private company). See generally STEINBERG, supra note 26,
at 463 (explaining that courts have acknowledged a private right of action despite no
legislative history indicating Congress ever intended to create one).
29. See In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1998)
(reviewing de novo the plaintiffs claim that IBM violated § 10(b) by making false
statements about its dividend); STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 463-65 (listing the full
range of elements for a § 10(b) cause of action).
30. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see also
Parkcentra 763 F.3d at 201 (plaintiffs sued the company whose stock was the basis for
their swap agreement with another party); Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de
Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(plaintiffs sued defendants for fraudulently inducing them to purchase a boat).
31. STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 463.
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Firstbrook3 2 and Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell The
conduct-and-effects test remained the prevailing test in U.S. courts
for over three decades." In this two-prong test, courts examined
whether the fraudulent conduct occurred in the United States and to
what extent the fraud affected the United States and U.S. investors."
Although § 10(b) did not mention an extraterritorial scope, courts
found that fraudulent conduct originating in the United States or
having an effect on U.S. investors or securities markets created § 10(b)
liability.36 Circuit courts, however, were split as to whether the domestic
conduct had to be material or merely significant to the fraud."
In using the conduct-and-effects test, courts considered whether
the Congress that passed the Act would have wanted § 10(b) to apply
in the particular case." This general approach is sometimes called
imaginative reconstruction of legislative intent." This method of
inquiry led to wide unpredictability where determinative factors in
one case would not be sufficient in another case.0 Slowly, courts and
commentators began to criticize the conduct-and-effects test."
32. 405 F.2d 200, 206, 209 (2d Cir. 1968) (using the effects portion of the test).
33. 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (using the conduct portion of the test),
abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
34. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257-58 (remarking that the conduct-and-effects test
became "the north star" of § 10(b) jurisprudence).
35. See Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that satisfaction of one prong was sufficient to incur § 10(b)
liability), affd sub nom. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d 198.
36. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257.
37. See In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1316-17
(S.D. Fla. 2010) (describing how the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits held that the domestic conduct must be "material to the fraud's
success," while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
only required the conduct to be significant), aff'd sub nom. Inversiones Mar Octava
Limitada v. Banco Santander S.A., 439 F. App'x 840 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
38. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255-56 (describing the development of the conduct-
and-effects test and the historical understanding that courts were left to discern the
extraterritorial application of § 10(b)); Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1337 ("Still we must ask
ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about the point, it would not have wished to
protect an American investor.. .. " (emphasis added)), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247.
39. See generally Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 403-13
(2005) (differentiating and reconciling strict adherence to statutory text with the
"imaginative reconstruction" approach, in which interpreters attempt to determine
how the enacting legislators would have wanted the law to apply to a particular case).
40. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255--56, 258-59 (criticizing, for instance, how courts
analyzed the conduct portion of the test differently depending on whether the
investors were American or foreign).
41. See id. at 260-61 (describing the various criticisms of the conduct-and-effects
test from courts and commentators).
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3. The transactional test under Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.
The Supreme Court finally reviewed the conduct-and-effects test in
2010 with Morrison."2 Morrison presented a "foreign-cubed claim" of
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants over the
sale of the equivalent of shares of common stock on a foreign
exchange." National Australia Bank ("NAB") was the largest bank in
Australia." Its common stock traded on foreign exchanges, such as
the Australia Stock Exchange Limited, but not on any American
exchange." In February 1998, NAB bought a mortgage servicing
company, HomeSide Lending, Inc., in Florida."6 Australian nationals
brought a claim in the United States alleging that HomeSide
"manipulated [its] financial models" to make its business seem more
valuable than it actually was and that NAB was aware of the fraud."
The Southern District of New York, with the Second Circuit
affirming, dismissed the claim using the conduct-and-effects test. The
lower court stated that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a
case with such strong foreign elements."
The Supreme Court, however, found as an initial matter that the
lower courts did not accurately analyze the extraterritoriality of §
10(b)." Justice Scalia's majority opinion noted that courts apply a
strong presumption against extraterritoriality when interpreting U.S.
42. Though Congress attempted to overrule Morrison and reinstate the conduct-
and-effect test in § 929(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, most courts have found it to be
ineffectual due to a drafting error. The provision states that "district courts . . .shall
have jurisdiction over an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the [SEC]."
SEC v. A Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012)). Therefore, on its face, § 929(b) addresses ubject matter
jurisdiction, and Morrison said extraterritoriality was a question on the merits and not
on subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.; Arthur B. Laby, Regulation of Global Financial Firms
After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 87 ST.JOHN's L. REv. 561, 584-85 (2013).
43. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 250-51, 283 n.11.
44. Id. at 251.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 252.
48. Id. at 253.
49. Notably, the Supreme Court found that the extraterritoriality inquiry was not
a question of subject-matterjurisdiction but a merits question. Thus, the case should
have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, not Rule
12(b) (1). However, because remedying this error would merely involve fixing the
labels and would not change the end result, the Court continued with its analysis and
did not remand. See id. at 253-54.
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statutes;50 in other words, parties must make a strong showing that
Congress intended for them to apply extraterritorially.5 ' However,
Scalia clarified that the threshold was not so high as to require
statutes to explicitly include an extraterritorial application
provision.5 1 Courts could also look at the surrounding context.
The Court found that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act did not meet this
burden and thus did not apply extraterritoriality.5 1
To determine whether the transaction was sufficiently domestic to
fall under the statute, the Morrison Court developed a new test based
on the Exchange Act. The Court crafted a transactional test,
deciding that § 10(b) applies to "transactions in securities listed on
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities."5 ' The case at bar did not meet the transactional test
because NAB shares were not sold on a domestic exchange and
were not purchased or sold in the United States.5 Thus, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal.
4. History and previous use of the economic reality method
Courts had a relatively easy time delineating the transactional test's
first prong ("transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges") .5 However, there was less agreement on how to
50. Id. at 255 (noting that, according to a "longstanding principle of American
law," legislation from Congress will only apply within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States unless a contrary intent is made clear).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 265.
53. Id.
54. Id. Courts have gone on to find that the holdings of Morrison also apply to
other sections of the Exchange Act and other U.S. securities laws. See, e.g., Liu Meng-
Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (whistleblower anti-retaliation
provision of the Dodd-Frank Act); SEC v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229 (KBF), 2013 WL
2407172, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013) (section 17(a) of the Securities Act); In re
Smart Techs., Inc. S'Holder Litig., 295 F.R.D. 50, 55-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (sections 11
and 12(a) (2) of the Securities Act); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig., 842 F.
Supp. 2d 522, 527-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same).
55. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-67 (noting that the Exchange Act centered on the
purchase and sale of securities inside the United States and not on deception specifically).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 273.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 267. Although there were initial attempts to broadly read the first
prong as including cross-listed securities, courts quickly dismissed those claims. See
George T. Conway III, Morrison at Four: A Survey of Its Impact on Securities Litigation, in
FEDERAL CASES FROM FOREiGN PLAcEs 8-9 (2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
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determine when a transaction was domestic under the second prong
("domestic transaction in other securities").' Courts predominantly
used three methods to make this determination: the transfer of title
method,"' the irrevocable liability method,12 and the economic reality
method." When examining complex security instruments, courts
found the economic reality method as an especially useful analytical
structure." Courts in the past had used the economic reality method
to determine whether a complex instrument fell under the statutory
definition of a "security."" Under this test, courts emphasized a
given transaction's substance and not the instrument's specific
form.' The economic reality method allowed courts to adequately
uploads/sites/1/federal-cases.pdf (remarking that, if plaintiffs had succeeded, they
would have turned Morrison on its head). Case law has since settled that the first prong
means "'listed and traded' on a domestic exchange." Grossmann, supra note 7, at 354.
60. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 213 (2d
Cir. 2014) (per curiam); see also Calfee, supra note 13, at 170 (noting how courts developed
three different methods to deternine whether a transaction was domestic under Morrison).
61. See, e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur
Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (vacating the lower
court's dismissal because the stocks closed in Miami and the title of shares was
transferred to Quail when the stocks closed).
62. See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-
cv-01381-MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (dismissing the
case because plaintiffs incurred irrevocable liability in the Cayman Islands and thus
the transaction was not domestic); Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v.
Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reasoning that
placing a buy order for the stock in the United States was not a domestic transaction
because plaintiffs did not incur irrevocable liability at that point in the transaction).
63. See, e.g., Valentini v. Citigroup, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 304, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(using the economic reality method to determine that plaintiffs' convertible notes
were in reality put options in domestic stocks); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto.
Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding the securities-based
swap agreements to be the economic equivalent of plaintiffs purchasing shares on a
foreign exchange), affd sub nom. Parkcentra4 763 F.3d 198.
64. See, e.g., Valentini, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 324 (convertible notes); Elliott Assocs.,
759 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (securities-based swap agreements); SEC v. Credit Bancorp,
Ltd., 738 F. Supp. 2d 376, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (credit facility program).
65. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975)
(holding that a purchase into a housing cooperative did not constitute a security
under U.S. securities laws); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)
(declaring that the transaction in the case fell under the definition of an investment
contract); Cont'l Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1967) (remarking that
investors' purchase into a beaver breeding enterprise constituted a purchase of a security).
66. See United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 848 (noting that the name of an
instrument was not dispositive to the issue of whether it was a security as defined by
U.S. securities law); STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 61 (explaining that courts relied on
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deter fraud and protect investors by not allowing perpetrators to
create new instruments outside a narrow definition of a security.6 7
Courts using the economic reality method in relation to the
extraterritorial test wanted to apply the same reasoning to determine
whether securities transactions were domestic transactions.
5. The domestic transaction test under Absolute Activist Value Master
Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto
Finally, in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto," the
Second Circuit settled on a test to determine whether a transaction
was a "domestic transaction in other securities . . . ."" The court
examined whether foreign hedge funds' purchases through a U.S.
broker-dealer of securities issued by U.S. companies was a "domestic
transaction" under Morrison."o Plaintiffs were Cayman Island hedge
funds that hired Absolute Capital Management Holding Limited
("ACM") as their investment manager.7  Plaintiffs alleged that
defendants participated in a "pump-and-dump" scheme where
plaintiffs lost at least $195 million in U.S. penny stocks purchased
the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" in the Act when using the
economic reality method).
67. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) (inferring that
Congress valued eterring fraud and protecting investors over clarity); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (remarking that the Exchange Act is "remedial
legislation," and as such courts should interpret it broadly); Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d
at 475-76 (stating that the court must look at the economic reality of the swap to
determine whether it "fall [s] within the ambit of federal securities regulations").
68. 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012).
69. See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
201, 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Other jurisdictions have also widely
applied the Second Circuit's test. See Grossmann, supra note 7, at 355; see, e.g., SEC v.
Funinaga, No. 2:13-CV-1658JCM (CWH), 2014 WL 4977334, at *7-8 (D. Nev. Oct. 3,
2014); SEC v. A Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 917-18 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (finding that the SEC had sufficiently shown that irrevocable liability occurred
domestically to survive a motion to dismiss).
70. Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 62.
71. Id.
72. Perpetrators of a pump-and-dump scheme artificially raise the price of a stock
through false or exaggerated claims. Unsuspecting investors buy the stock, which helps
further raise prices. The perpetrators will then sell off their stock at the exaggerated
price while the victims will lose a significant portion of their investment as the stock price
falls. See DAvID L. ScoTr, WALL STREET WoRDis: AN A To Z GuIE TO INVESTMENT TERMS
FOR TODAVS INVESTOR 294 (3d ed. 2003); Pump and Dump, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pumpanddump.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
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through PIPE transactions. After the Morrison decision was
announced, the Southern District of New York dismissed Absolute
Activist sua sponte, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.7 1 On
appeal, plaintiffs argued that their complaint satisfied the second
prong of Morrison's transactional test. 7
The Second Circuit took this opportunity to elaborate on what
constituted a "domestic transaction in other securities." First, the
court examined the statutory and ordinary definitions of "purchase"
and "sale."7 7 A purchase or sale occurs when the purchaser and seller
become obliged to complete the transaction, or, in other words,
when the parties acquire irrevocable liability.78 Additionally, a sale in
its ordinary definition is considered "[t]he transfer of property or
title for a price."7 From these definitions, the court established the
rule that domestic transactions under Morrison are transactions where
the parties obtain irrevocable liability or transfer title in the United
States.o The court further explained that irrevocable liability meant
that "the purchaser incurred irrevocable liability within the United
States to take and pay for a security, or that the seller incurred
irrevocable liability within the United States to deliver a security.""'
The complaint did not "sufficiently allege that [the] purchases or
sales took place in the United States," so the court remanded to allow
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.8 2
Absolute Activist's domestic transaction test, while still focusing on
the location of the securities transaction, added an element of
flexibility to the overall inquiry. The title transfer" and irrevocable
73.Private investment in public equity (PIPE) transactions are transactions in
which qualified investors, like private investment firms, purchase considerable
shares in a public company at a discount. See Private Investment in Public Equity-
PIPE INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pipe.asp (last
visited Dec. 1, 2015).
74. Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 63.
75. Id. at 65.
76. Id. at 67.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 67-68.
79. Id. at 68 (citing Sale, BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
80. Id. at 67.
81. Id. at 68.
82. Id. at 69-71.
83. See, e.g., SEC v. Funinaga, No. 2:13-CV-1658JCM (CWH), 2014 WL 4977334,
at *8 (D. Nev. Oct. 3, 2014) (holding that defendants transferred title in the United
States when they "transmitted application forms, money, and investment certificates
to and from Las Vegas offices and bank accounts"); SEC v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229
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liability" inquiries can depend on the nature of the security at issue.
For instance, although typically wiring money to a bank in the United
States is not enough factually to establish irrevocable liability, the
court found it was enough in Arco Capital Corps. v. Deutsche Bank AG."
However, at its core, the domestic transaction test is still a location-
based test." In the digital world, the location of a security transaction
has become "increasingly illusory . . . ."" While the irrevocable
liability or transfer of title inquiries can rely heavily on the
particularities of the specific contractual provisions, the location of
the transaction may have little connection to the fraud."
B. Recent Developments Under Parkcentral
The issues and potential inconsistencies of relying solely on a
transactional test to determine the applicability of § 10(b) are
highlighted in Parkcentral. Due to the distinctive nature of the
security at issue, the case provided the court with a unique
opportunity to critically examine Morrison's transactional test. The
security appeared to pass the transactional test even though the case
seemed impermissibly foreign. The Second Circuit rectified this
potential inconsistency in case law by determining that, although it
was necessary for a case to pass Morrison's transactional test for §
10(b) to apply, passing the Morrison test alone was not sufficient."
(KBF), 2013 WL 2407172, at *3, *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013) (concluding that the
transfer of title occurred domestically based in part on the fact that the trade
confirmations originated in New York).
84. See, e.g., City of Pontiac Policemen's & Firemen's Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752
F.3d 173, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2014) (deciding that the fact that the buy order was placed in
the United States was not enough, on its own, to incur irrevocable liability); Tourre, 2013
WL 2407172, at *12-13 (concluding that ACA LLC incurred irrevocable liability when
the master agreement and trade confirmations were signed in the United States).
85. Compare Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 70 (holding that investors wiring money
to a bank in New York was not enough to make the transaction domestic), and MVP
Asset Mgmt. (USA) LLC v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483-GEB-CKD, 2012 WL 2873371,
at *7 (E.D. Cal.July 12, 2012) (same), with Arco Capital Corps. v. Deutsche Bank AG,
949 F. Supp. 2d 532, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the money sent to HSBC
in New York was sufficient to impose irrevocable liability on the parties because the
Note Subscription Agreements provided that the contract would be irrevocably
binding when the money was delivered).
86. Second Circuit Holds Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at 1437.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1436-37.
89. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 215-
16 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
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Thus, the court added a flexible element to the overall
extraterritoriality inquiry while still adhering to Morrison.
1. The case in the Southern District of New York
Before Absolute Activist, the Southern District of New York heard
another § 10(b) case called Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil
Holding SE."o This case involved domestic and foreign plaintiffs' who
had purchased from a third party securities-backed swap agreements
that were tied to the price of Volkswagen AG ("Volkswagen") shares
listed on a foreign exchange." The plaintiffs took the equivalent of
short positions" in Volkswagen shares, meaning they would profit if
the shares declined in price." However, Volkswagen share prices
skyrocketed on the European Stock Exchange once Porsche
Automobile Holding SE ("Porsche")" officially announced its intention
to take over Volkswagen."6 This resulted in a historic short squeeze
where, "while some 12.8% of [Volkswagen] shares were on loan ...
those that for practical purposes were in circulation amounted to only
6%."" Plaintiffs alleged defendants made fraudulent statements and
concealed Porsche's intention to take over Volkswagen.9 8
The court used the economic reality method to determine that the
transaction was not a "domestic transaction [] in other securities"
90. 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd sub nom., Parkcentral, 763 F.3d 198.
91. Id. at 471 (both international and omestic hedge funds).
92. Id.; see also Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 205 ("A securities-based swap agreement
is a private contract between two parties in which they 'agree to exchange cash
flows that depend on the price of a reference security, here [Volkswagen]
shares."' (citation omitted)).
93. "To take a short position in a stock, an investor borrows shares of the stock
from a broker and sells them for the then-prevailing price. At some point in the
future, the investor must purchase nough shares of the stock to replace the shares
of stock borrowed from the broker.... [If] the purchase price is higher than the price
at which the investor initially sold the security-i.e., if the stock price has increased-
the investor will take a loss, selling low and buying high." Joint Brief and Special
Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7, Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto.
Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 11-0397) (citations omitted).
94. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 201; Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 470, 471 n.2; see
also Joint Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 93, at 9
(explaining that "if party A is long the swap, and party B is short the swap, then party A
will receive money from party B when the price of the stock rises, and party B will
receive money from party A when the price of the stock falls").
95. Porsche is a German company. Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
96. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 205; Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
97. Joint Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 93, at 15.
98. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 201; Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
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under the transactional test.' Although the parties conducted the
swap agreements in the United States, the court held that the
transaction's economic reality was more akin to domestic plaintiffs
buying foreign shares of a foreign company on a foreign exchange.00
Applying § 10(b) to these securities would not be true to Morrison's
intent to maintain a strong presumption against extraterritoriality
because the case's major elements were foreign despite the fact that
the swap agreements were physically conducted in the United
States.'o' The court dismissed the case, and the plaintiffs appealed.102
2. The case in the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit did not fully perform Morrison's transactional
test,'0o affirming the dismissal on other grounds.o Instead, the court
determined that, although a domestic transaction (or a transaction in
a domestically listed security) was necessary for a court to find § 10(b)
liability, passing Morrison's transactional test was not sufficient for §
10(b) to apply.'5 In some cases, courts would have to analyze a
variety of other factors to determine whether the transaction was
sufficiently domestic for § 10(b) to apply.'0o
The court noted that Mornison concerned conventional purchases
of stocks, while this case differed because it concerned securities-
based swap agreements.'o7  Plaintiffs' securities-based swap
agreements may have referenced Volkswagen shares, but neither
party to the swap ever actually owned the shares.'08 The swaps were
distinct from the referenced security. '" The court admitted its
holding depended in part on the unique nature of the security
99. Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 475-76.
100. Id. at 474, 476.
101. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 201-02; Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476; see also
Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010) (noting that the
presumption was a strong enough "watchdog" that it would not retreat at the first
sign of any domestic activity).
102. Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476-77.
103. See id. at 216 (stating that the facts of the case were so "predominately foreign
as to be impermissibly extraterritorial").
104. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 201.
105. Id. at 215-16.
106. See id. at 217 (calling for courts to use a fact-specific analysis to determine
whether a case is sufficiently domestic for § 10(b) to apply).
107. Id. at 214.
108. Id. at 206.
109. Id.
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involved but also declined to determine whether it would have come
to the same conclusion if a different type of security were involved."o
The court gave two main reasons for why passing the transactional
test is insufficient to determine whether a transaction is sufficiently
domestic for § 10(b) liability."' First, the court noted that the
specific language used by the Supreme Court did not say it was
sufficient."' In Morrison, the Supreme Court stated that § 10(b)
applies only to "transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges[] and domestic transactions in other securities . . . .
The Court did not say "§ 10(b) will be deemed domestic whenever
such a transaction is present.""' The Supreme Court used language
delineating that transaction location was a necessary element to make
§ 10(b) applicable but did not say it was dispositive."5 Second, the
Second Circuit argued that a bright-line rule would undermine
Morrison's insistence that § 10(b) did not apply extraterritorially."6
Litigants can bring § 10(b) cases against any entity that committed a
fraud in connection with the security transaction; the entity does not
necessarily have to be a participant in the security transaction."'
Therefore, cases could concern a domestic transaction but still
include impermissibly foreign facts."'
Examining a variety of factors,"9 the court determined that the
facts of Parkcentral were too foreign to comport with the underlying
principles of Morrison.'2 0 The case concerned an alleged fraud by
foreign defendants that occurred in a foreign country regarding
110. Id. at 202.
111. Id. at 215.
112. Id.




117. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012);
see, e.g., Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 219 (Leval, J., concurring) (noting that plaintiffs sued
the company whose stock was the basis for their swap agreement with another party).
118. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 215.
119. The determination was particular to the facts of this case: (a) involving
statements of a German company, (b) mostly made in Germany, (c) about another
German company, (d) which is traded on only foreign exchanges, (e) where the
defendants did not participate in the plaintiffs' swap agreements, (f) where plaintiffs had
no actual ownership in that stock (though the swap agreements reference the German
stock), (g) where German authorities investigated these statements, and (h) where the
case was in front of German courts. Id. at 216; id. at 218 (LevalJ., concurring).
120. Id. at 216.
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foreign securities traded on a foreign exchange.'"' Although
plaintiffs and other third parties allegedly entered into the swap
agreements in the United States, the foreign defendants were not in
any way involved in these transactions.'22 Therefore, the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaints.
Parkcentral will have a major impact on future securities fraud cases,
but the Second Circuit still left open some issues going forward.'1 3
The court did not give any specific test for courts to use in the future
to determine when a case is sufficiently domestic to warrant § 10(b)
liability.' Moreover, the court did not comment on how the
economic reality method would fit into this analysis, if at all.
II. THE ADDITION OF THE SUFFICIENCY PRONG TO THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL TEST WILL HELP COURTS ADHERE TO MORRISON
This Part advocates for a new structure of the extraterritoriality
inquiry based on Parkcentral's holding. Courts should first perform
the Morrison transactional test as a threshold matter, then address
whether the transaction meets Parkcentrats sufficiency test. The
sufficiency test will be a factor-based test, requiring courts to look at the
totality of the circumstances.2 5 The new structure of the test adheres
to the principles set forth in Morison and is not an attempt by the
Second Circuit o return to the overruled conduct-and-effects test.
Next, the economic reality method is still viable after Parkcentral.
Courts, however, should not use the economic reality method as part
of Morrison's transactional test as the district court did in its decision.12 6
Instead, courts should use the economic reality method as one of the
factors of the sufficiency test. The inclusion of the economic reality
method in the extraterritorial framework will allow courts to more
effectively apply Morrison to a variety of security instruments.
121. Id. at 216.
122. Id. at 207.
123. See So Much for Bright-Line Tests on Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Securities Laws?,
supra note 16 (listing several "intriguing questions" raised by Parkcentral.
124. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 217.
125. See id. (calling on future courts to determine whether a case is sufficiently
domestic by carefully analyzing the facts specific to each case); id. at 218 (Leval, J.,
concurring) (listing some of the specific factors the court used to come to its
decision in Parkcentrao.
126. See Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding the securities-based swap agreement was not a domestic
transaction because in economic reality the swaps were more akin to plaintiffs
purchasing stocks on a foreign exchange), aff'd sub nom. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d 198.
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Furthermore, the new two-step extraterritoriality test will help
courts maintain Morrison's strong presumption against
extraterritoriality. Although the Morrison Court fashioned the
transactional test to preserve this presumption, the test's singular
focus on transaction location can result in rulings that are at odds
with the presumption in some instances. The test advocated below
will strengthen Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality by
providing courts with more tools to evaluate cases with foreign elements.
Courts can address international comity concerns through the economic
reality method and the totality of the circumstances framework.
Additionally, the new extraterritorial test strengthens the presumption
by establishing a balance between flexible and bright-line rules.
A. The New Extraterritorial Test Should Be Morrison's Transactional Test
Followed by Parkcentral's Sufficiency Test
In Parkcentral, the Second Circuit did not state any specific test it
used to determine that the facts were not sufficient to invoke §
10(b).' 7 The court left it to future courts "eventually to develop a
reasonable and consistent governing body of law" based upon a fact-
specific analysis of the particular case at hand.' Courts should now
first conduct the transactional test as a threshold matter, and then apply
the sufficiency test using a totality of the circumstances analysis of a
variety of factors. The addition of a sufficiency test will provide both
flexibility and consistency to the overall extraterritorial framework.
1. The sufficiency test will be a factor-based test
Courts will first perform Morrison's transactional test. ' Initially,
courts must determine whether the case involves a security "listed on
domestic exchange []" or a "domestic transaction [ ] in other securities
. . .. "D'o For the first prong of the transactional test, a court will
examine whether the security at issue is "listed and traded on a
domestic exchange."'"' For the second prong, courts will use the
127. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 217.
128. Id.
129. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010) (describing
its two-prong transactional test); supra Part I.A.4-5 (detailing how further definitions
for both prongs were settled by subsequent cases).
130. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
131. See Grossmann, supra note 7, at 354 (describing how courts rejected the cross-
listing theory that § 10(b) claims with foreign exchange transactions are permissible
"as long as securities of the same class were also listed on a U.S. exchange, either as a
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Absolute Activist test to determine whether the parties incurred
irrevocable liability or transferred title in the United States.'3 1 If the
case does not pass either of these tests, then the court can dismiss the
case for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).'3 3 If the case
does pass the transactional test, then the court can move on to the
second step of the extraterritorial test.
Based on Parkcentral's holding, courts will now also have to
determine whether a case is sufficiently domestic to warrant § 10(b)
liability. Under the sufficiency test, the court will look at a variety of
other factors and, based on the totality of the circumstances, determine
whether § 10(b) applies. Although this Comment focuses on only one
of these factors,' it is apparent hat courts will use other factors, such as
whether there is a concurrent investigation in another country'3 5 and
the nature of the defendant's connection to the security at issue.'
The new extraterritorial framework of the transactional test and
sufficiency test is consistent with the Exchange Act and Morrison for two
important reasons. First, the sufficiency test correctly takes into
consideration the purpose and intent underlying the Exchange Act.
Congress passed the Exchange Act to protect investors and ensure the
integrity of U.S. securities markets.' Strict adherence to a bright-line
rule that only analyzes transaction location can erode confidence in the
U.S. securities markets and facilitate fraudulent schemes. Bright-line rules
help give potential securities law violators a roadmap of how to remain
dual listing or as a cross-listing in the form of American Depository Receipts"
(footnote omitted)).
132. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012).
133. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254 (noting that the extraterritorial analysis was a
merits question; thus, dismissal of these cases would be under Rule 12(b)(6) and
not Rule 12(b) (1)).
134. See infra Part II.B (describing the economic reality method).
135. See Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
218 (2d Cir. 2014) (Leval, J., concurring) (per curiam) (explaining that one of the
factors the court used in its decision that Parkcentral was not sufficiently domestic was
that the German authorities already investigated the fraud, and the issue is currently
in front of German courts).
136. See id. at 218 (considering the fact that defendants were not a part of, nor
were aware of, plaintiffs' securities-based swap agreements).
137. See STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 463 (providing a general overview of the
Exchange Act and § 10(b)); Second Circuit Holds Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at
1434 ("[T]he Exchange Act is at its core a remedial statute designed to protect
investors and the integrity of the U.S. securities markets, as well as to provide
adequate deterrence and compensation for fraud.").
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outside U.S. jurisdiction.'3 8 The new extraterritorial test addresses this
concern by adding a second flexible step into the analysis. In this second
step, plaintiffs would have to demonstrate, based on a variety of other
factors,'"3 that the case is sufficiently domestic. Therefore, potential
securities law violators could not so determinatively structure their scheme
to remain outside § 10(b)'s scope.
Second, the addition of the sufficiency test fits into the
development of the extraterritoriality jurisprudence."' Courts tried
to keep the extraterritoriality inquiry very flexible with the conduct-
and-effects test.'"' In practice, however, the conduct-and-effect test
was too unpredictable. The Supreme Court in Morrison instituted a
bright-line proclamation that § 10(b) did not apply extraterritorially,
and courts should use a two-prong transactional test to determine
whether cases were sufficiently domestic."' Then, the Second Circuit
in Absolute Activist added some flexibility to the transactional test
under the domestic transaction prong."' Irrevocable liability and
transfer of title can, to an extent, be context-specific to the type of
security."' Nonetheless, the flexibility under the transactional test
was limited because the inquiry was still based on the transaction
location."' Commentators noted that, in securities cases where the
transaction location was more "happenstance," application of only
the transactional test could lead to results that diametrically opposed
Morrison."'6  The sufficiency analysis completes this trend by
foreclosing a major loophole that potential fraudsters could still use.
138. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 285 (Stevens, J., concurring) (providing the
hypothetical of executives of a subsidiary company located in the United States
fraudulently inducing American investors to buy shares in the parent corporation,
which was only listed on a foreign exchange); Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 218 (Leval, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Morrison did not intend to create a bright-line rule).
139. Courts could use such factors as economic reality, whether there is a
concurrent investigation in another country, or defendants' connection to the
security at issue. See supra Part II.A.I.
140. See supra Part I.
141. See supra Part I.A.2.
142. See supra Part.I.A.3.
143. See supra Part I.A.5.
144. See Second Circuit Holds Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at 1433, 1435 &
n.48 (construing Absolute Activist as adding some flexibility to Morrison's transactional
test because of the fact-intensive nature of the examination under irrevocable
liability and transfer of title).
145. See id. at 1436-37 (noting that the flexibility of the Absolute Activist test is still
limited because the test is still under the scope of determining only transaction location).
146. See, e.g., John Chambers, Note, Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action:
Redefining the Transactional Test in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 31 REv. BANKiNG
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2. The sufficiency analysis is not a return to the conduct-and-effects test
At a superficial glance, the language of the Second Circuit in
Parkcentral could seem reminiscent of the previously overturned
conduct-and-effects test."' The court in its inquiry focused on the
particular facts of the case."' Many of these facts align with the main
issue that Porsche's allegedly fraudulent conduct took place primarily
on foreign soil."' The Second Circuit did not proffer a specific test
with exact elements, but called on future courts to analyze carefully
the facts specific to their cases to make the sufficiency
determination. 150 The Morrison Court lambasted the conduct-and-
effects test, which evaluated the particular circumstances of each
case, as leading to widely unpredictable results.'5 ' For example,
Morrison criticized how courts under the conduct-and-effects test
would analyze the conduct portion of the test differently depending
on whether the investors were domestic or foreign.'15
However, the sufficiency test is not a return to the conduct-and-
effects test because the flexible, factor-based test of Parkcentral will be
a test separate from the transactional test of Morrison. As explained in
Judge Leval's concurrence, Morrison's criticisms of the conduct-and-
effects test were related to how such concerns should not have been
under the extraterritoriality analysis. ' Conversely, the sufficiency
test maintains the presumption against extraterritoriality of Morrison.
The sufficiency test is not a return to the conduct-and-effects test
& FIN. L. 411, 427, 435 (2011) (remarking that courts will struggle with determining the
location of swap transactions for purposes of applying the Morrison test); Second Circuit
Holds Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at 1436 (finding this trend in the case of securities-
based swap agreements, over-the-counter securities, and American Depository Receipts).
147. See Alisha Patterson, Case Comment, Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd v. Porsche
Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014), 38 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 233,
250 (2015) (misconstruing Parkcentra's analysis as inappropriately similar to the
conduct test); So Much for Bright-Line Tests, supra note 16 (declaring that the Second
Circuit "got its revenge" on the Supreme Court with Parkcentral).
148. See Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
218 (2d Cir. 2014) (Leval, J., concurring) (per curiam) (listing the various facts
considered by the court in its decision).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 217.
151. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
152. Id. at 255-56, 258-59.
153. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 219 (Leval, J., concurring); see also Conway, supra note
59, at 4, 16 ("For the point of Morrison was not to adopt a 'bright-line rule[]' for the
sake of having a bright-line rule, but rather to . .. fashion a 'test that will avoid' the
'interference with foreign ... regulation that application of [U.S. law] would
produce.'" (footnote omitted)).
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because it is positioned in a different place in the inquiry.'5 ' The
sufficiency test is part of the analysis to determine whether a
transaction is sufficiently domestic to warrant § 10(b) liability.' 55
Moreover, cases must still pass Morrison's transactional test for § 10(b)
to apply.'5 ' The sufficiency test also recognizes that, in today's highly
complex and international financial markets, a bright-line rule would
not always be the best way for courts to maintain that presumption.5
After Parkcentral, courts should now use a two-step extraterritorial
test, which combines Morrison's transactional test with a new
sufficiency test. In the new sufficiency portion of the test, courts will
evaluate a variety of factors and, based on the totality of the
circumstances, decide whether the case is sufficiently domestic to
warrant the application of § 10(b). The new extraterritorial
framework is consistent with the Exchange Act and Morrison. The
new test helps protect investors and ensure the integrity of the U.S.
securities market by combining bright-line and flexible tests to deter
potential securities law violators from developing schemes outside §
10(b)'s scope. Additionally, the sufficiency test fits into the development
of the extraterritorial jurisprudence. The new framework is not a return
to the conduct-and-effects test because it does not decide whether a case
applies extraterritorially but incorporates a flexible analysis to
strengthen the presumption against extraterritoriality.
B. The Economic Reality Method Will Be Part of the New Extraterritorial Test
The economic reality method is still viable after the Second
Circuit's decision in Parkcentral; the Second Circuit did not
specifically overrule the district court's method. However, the Elliott
Associates court erred in using the economic reality method as part of
the transactional test.'"8 Courts should instead use the economic
reality method as one of the factors in the sufficiency test.
154. See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 218-19 (Leval, J., concurring) (explaining that the
conduct-and-effects test was criticized by the Supreme Court because it improperly
"'disregard[ed]' the presumption against extraterritoriality" (alteration in original)
(quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255)).
155. But cf Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1337
(2d Cir. 1972) (asking whether Congress would have wanted § 10(b) to apply to such
a case with foreign elements), abrogated by Mornison, 561 U.S. 247.
156. See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 215-16 (holding that § 10(b) applied only to cases
that passed Morrison's transactional test).
157. Id. at 219 (Leval,J., concurring).
158. See Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476-77
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd sub nom. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d 198.
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1. The economic reality method is still viable post-Parkcentral
Although the Second Circuit did not comment on the district
court's reliance on the economic reality method, the method is still
viable in determining § 10(b) liability. Courts have long used
economic reality to determine whether unique security instruments,
like derivatives, fall under the securities laws.' In this jurisprudence,
courts emphasized the economic reality of the transaction over the
specific form of the instrument.'" Courts now in the extraterritorial
framework are likewise faced with determining whether cases with
complex securities are covered by § 10(b) liability. The economic
reality method provides a solid framework for courts to evaluate how
unique securities fit into § 10(b). Courts use the economic reality
method, keeping in mind the purposes of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act: to maintain integrity in the market and protect
investors.'6 1  The economic reality method allowed courts to
adequately deter fraud and protect investors by not allowing
perpetrators to create new instruments outside a narrow definition of a
security." Similarly, in the extraterritorial framework, courts have
struggled with implementing a clear test that also ensures that
perpetrators cannot easily create new security instruments outside the
scope of § 10(b). Using the economic reality method as one of the factors
in the sufficiency test provides a solid foundation for courts to look
159. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975); Elliott
Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
160. See United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 848 (noting that the name of an
instrument was not dispositive in determining whether it was a security as defined by
U.S. securities laws); STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 61 (explaining that courts relied on
the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" in the Act when using the
economic reality method).
161. See United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 849 (referencing the "primary purpose" of
both Acts in using the economic reality method); STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 463
(providing a general overview of the Exchange Act and § 10(b)); Second Circuit Holds
Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at 1434 ("[T]he Exchange Act is at its core a
remedial statute designed to protect investors and the integrity of the U.S. securities
markets, as well as to provide adequate deterrence. . . .").
162. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) (inferring that
Congress valued deterring fraud and protecting investors over clarity); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (remarking that courts should broadly interpret
remedial legislation like the Exchange Act); Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 475-76
(stating that the court must look at the economic reality of the swap to determine
whether it "fall [s] within the ambit of federal securities regulations").
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towards the substance of how security transactions affect U.S. and foreign
markets and not focus solely on the specific form of the security. 16
For example, in Parkcentral, the plaintiffs had both short sales and
private securities-based swaps."' The short sales and the securities-
based swap agreements economically created the same effect.'6 1
Originally, the plaintiffs based their § 10(b) claim solely on the short
sales.'6 ' After Morrison, however, the plaintiffs had to switch their
claims to be based solely on the swaps because the short sales were
foreign securities transactions.66 Accepting the plaintiffs' contention
that the swap agreements were conducted in the United States,
applying only the transactional test would result in short sales not
being covered by § 10(b), but the swap agreements would be
covered." By focusing only on the form of the security transaction
and not also the substance, courts would not be accurately applying
Morrison. As the defendants noted in Parkcentral: "There is no basis
for [courts] to adopt a rule that would favor sophisticated investors
who enter into private swap agreements over ordinary investors who
trade directly in the same foreign-traded securities."' Both
securities transactions are impermissibly foreign and, according to
163. See United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 848 (noting that courts must look past the
actual name of the instrument and examine how the instrument functioned to
determine whether it was a security); STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 61 (explaining
courts relied on the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" in the Act when
using the economic reality method).
164. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Porsche Automobil Holding SE at 3, Parkcentral
Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 11-0397).
165. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
166. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Porsche Automobil Holding SE, supra note 164, at 3.
167. Id.; see Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (holding
that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially).
168. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee Porsche Automobil Holding SE, supra note
164, at 29 ("[I]t would not ... be an acceptable outcome for an individual who had
benefitted from insider information and who would be legally prohibited from
buying a stock ... to be able to engage in a total return swap that was the functional
equivalent of buying that stock." (quoting The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000: Joint Hearing on S. 2697 Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry and
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 14 (2000) (statement
of Lawrence Summers, Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of the Treasury))); Letter from Robert
J. Guiffra, Jr., Counsel for Appellees, to Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of the
Court 1-2 (May 12, 2014), Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE,
763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 11-0397).
169. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Porsche Automobil Holding SE, supra note 164, at 5.
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Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality, neither transaction
should incur § 10(b) liability.o70
2. Economic reality will be one of the factors in the sufficiency analysis
Although the district court in Elliott Associates came to the right
conclusion, the court erred in using the economic reality method as
part of the transactional test. 171 After Absolute Activist, using the
economic reality method to determine transaction location is
inappropriate." The economic reality method should instead be
one of the factors under the sufficiency analysis.
As described in Part II.A.1, the sufficiency test will occur after
Morrison's transactional test. The sufficiency test uses a variety of
factors to determine whether a transaction is sufficiently domestic for
§ 10(b) to apply."' Courts will apply a totality of the circumstances
analysis where no one factor is required or more important than the
others."' This Comment contends that the economic reality method
should be one of those factors. Although a given case might pass the
transactional test, courts should still look past the form of the security
and inquire how the security functioned in its economic reality. 171
The placement of the economic reality method in the sufficiency
test would be ideal for several important reasons. First, the
extraterritorial test would better correspond with Morrison by having
the economic reality method as a factor in the sufficiency test as
opposed to using it under the transactional test. The district court in
Elliott Associates used the economic reality method in the transactional
test, and it created some potential inconsistencies. The district court
170. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265-66 (stating that just because a case has some
domestic elements, it does not mean that § 10(b) automatically applies as it is rare
for a case to have no domestic elements).
171. See Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476-77
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd sub nom. Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto.
Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
172. SeeAbsolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012).
173. See supra Part II.A.1.
174. Though this Comment focuses on only one factor of the sufficiency test, it is
conceivable that courts will use other factors, such as the extent of a defendant's
connection to the security at issue and whether a concurrent investigation in another
country has commenced.
175. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59 (1975)
(determining that the "stock" involved in the case was not a security because
plaintiffs were functionally renting an apartment for their own use); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-300 (1946) (finding that the transactions at issue were
investment contracts because in reality the investors were not citrus farmers and,
therefore, were relying on the efforts of third parties for their profit).
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held that the plaintiffs' securities-based swap agreements were the
economic equivalent of purchasing shares on a foreign exchange.'7 6
Therefore, § 10(b) liability could not apply to the case.1' However,
following that line of reasoning, foreign parties could create a
securities-based swap agreement, but as long as the underlying
security was a U.S. stock, § 10(b) liability would apply.77 This result
does not comport with the underlying principles of Mormison, such as the
strong presumption against extraterritoriality."'7 The hypothetical case
would still have strong foreign elements, and it would be inappropriate
for courts to attach § 10(b) liability to such a case.0̀
However, placing the economic reality method under the
sufficiency portion of the test and not the transactional test helps to
apply Mornison appropriately. If the foreign parties conducted the
swap abroad, the case would not pass the transactional test and the
court would complete its inquiry.'"' If the foreign parties created the
swap domestically, then the court could turn to the various factors of
the sufficiency test. The court would look at the economic reality of
the transaction and find it was similar to plaintiffs purchasing a U.S.
stock on a domestic exchange. Nevertheless, the court would still
need to look at the totality of the circumstances. The economic
reality method would point towards the application of § 10(b), yet
there might be other stronger factors that convince the court the
transaction is too foreign. 8 2
Second, economic reality would be only one of the factors that
courts would use to determine sufficiency.'18  Therefore, in cases
176. Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
177. Id. at 476-77.
178. See Chambers, supra note 146, at 427-28 (remarking that the court in Elliott
Associates reached the correct outcome but with faulty reasoning); see also Richard W.
Painter, Comment Letter on Release No. 34-63174; File No. 4-617, Study on
Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action 6 (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-7.pdf (reasoning that Congress, with the
Dodd-Frank Act, should have addressed when swap agreements occur within the
United States instead of having courts decipher when they occur).
179. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (holding that
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially).
180. See id. at 265-66 (noting that the presumption was a strong enough "watchdog"
such that it would not retreat at the first sign of any domestic activity).
181. See id. at 267 (finding that "securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic
transactions in other securities" are the only transactions that fall under§ 10(b) jurisdiction).
182. See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
217 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (remarking that courts should conduct a fact-
specific analysis when applying the sufficiency test).
183. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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where the instrument is simple, courts would not need to use the
economic reality method. The focus of the extraterritorial
framework would still be on the transaction as directed by Morrison,
but that would not be final.' In cases with more complicated
securities instruments, the court could use the economic reality
method to determine whether in reality the transaction location
should be sufficient to determine § 10(b) liability.
The economic reality method is still viable after Parkcentral.
However, the economic reality method should not be used to
determine transaction location.8 5 This Comment argues courts
should use the economic reality method as one of the factors in the
sufficiency test. By placing the economic reality method in the
sufficiency test, courts would better be able to appropriately apply
Morrison to a wide range of security instruments and fact patterns.
C. The New Two-Step Extratemitorial Test Strengthens Morrison's
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The new two-step extraterritorial test will help courts to maintain
Morrison's strong presumption against extraterritoriality. Under the
extraterritorial analysis, cases will rarely have all foreign elements and
no connection to the United States.'6 More often, cases will have a
mixture of foreign and domestic elements, and courts must evaluate
those elements to determine whether the transaction is sufficiently
domestic to fall under § 10(b)."8 Although the Supreme Court in
Morrison developed the transactional test to facilitate this inquiry, the
test's singular focus on transaction location can actually hinder the
preservation of the presumption against extraterritoriality in some
instances. The two-step extraterritorial test will strengthen Morrison's
presumption against extraterritoriality by addressing more fully
184. See Mornson, 561 U.S. at 266, 272 (arguing that the focus of the Exchange Act
is not fraud generally, but only fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security in the United States).
185. Compare Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469,
475-76 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (using the economic reality method to determine whether
the security transaction in the case was a domestic transaction under Morrison), affd sub
nom. Parkcentra4 763 F.3d 198, with Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677
F.3d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2012) (defining domestic transactions as transactions where the
parties obtain irrevocable liability or transfer title in the United States).
186. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (clarifying that the presumption against
extraterritoriality often is not "self-evidently dispositive").
187. See id. ("[T]he presumption against extraterritorial application would be a
craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is
involved in the case.").
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international comity concerns and establishing the proper balance
between flexible and bright-line rules.
1. The new two-step extratenitorial test will satisfy international comity concerns
A common concern among courts addressing questions of
extraterritoriality is how to adequately address international comity
concerns." The Supreme Court noted such an apprehension in its
analysis of the extraterritoriality of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act in
Morrison.'8 9 For instance, in its holding the Court, in part, considered
how there could be major conflicts with other countries' regulations
if § 10(b) did apply abroad."' However, in the Exchange Act,
Congress made no reference as to how courts could address any
conflicts with foreign laws."' Therefore, Congress did not intend §
10(b) to apply extraterritorially.'"
Though Morrison helped alleviate some of the international comity
concerns, courts still struggled.' Courts were using the transactional
test to determine whether transactions were sufficiently domestic for §
10(b) liability to apply; however, the singular focus of the transactional
test was ill-suited to adequately address more complicated security
instruments.' The new two-step extraterritorial test would help
188. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (recognizing that
international comity concerns "having due regard both to international duty and
convenience[] and to the rights of its own citizens"); Joel R. Paul, The Transformation
of International Comity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 2008, at 19, 21 (defining
international comity as asking courts to balance conflicting public policies between
domestic and foreign sovereigns).
189. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (observing that the Commonwealth of Australia,
the United Kingdom, and France submitted amicus briefs in the case arguing that
applying § 10(b) indiscriminately abroad would interfere with their own countries'
securities laws and enforcement).
190. Id.; see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991)
(reasoning that because Congress did not provide any procedures to reconcile
conflicting foreign laws, Congress must not have intended Title VII to apply abroad),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(a), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1077, as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 512-13 (2006).
191. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269.
192. Id. at 265, 269.
193. See, e.g., In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317
(S.D. Fla. 2010) (remarking that because plaintiffs invested in Bahamian funds,
allowing this case to continue would be an "interference with foreign securities
regulation"), affd sub nom. Inversiones Mar Octava Limitada v. Banco Santander S.A.,
439 F. App'x 840 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
194. See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
215-16 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that passing Morrison's transactional
test was not sufficient to incur § 10(b) liability).
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alleviate international comity concerns for the full range of securities
and maintain Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality.
The combination of the transaction and sufficiency tests would
help courts better address international comity concerns in two
important ways. First, during the sufficiency analysis, courts could
look at the economic reality of the instrument.'9 5 Especially when
cases involve unique securities, like derivatives, the economic reality
of the instrument would help courts more methodically take into
consideration international comity concerns, such as legal and
regulatory conflicts. Although the security instrument may facially
be a domestic transaction, courts could examine through the
economic reality method whether the security functioned as such.'9
If the security in fact functioned more akin to a foreign security,
that would count against the court finding the case sufficiently
domestic to incur § 10 (b) liability. Second, the totality of the
circumstances framework would allow courts to factor in other
aspects that directly implicate international comity. For instance,
courts could consider whether there is a concurrent investigation in
another country, militating against applying § 10(b).'"
In Parkcentral, the swap agreement seemed to be a U.S. security
transaction; however, the economic reality of the transaction was
more akin to plaintiffs purchasing shares in a foreign company
traded on a foreign exchange.' Applying U.S. securities law to this
transaction would lead to potential conflicts with German securities
law.'" Swaps are contracts between two private parties;200 the issuer
of the referenced security could have no knowledge of these swaps
and potentially complied with all local laws.20' Morrison's holding that
§ 10(b) had no extraterritorial application would not be followed by
195. See supra Part II.B.2.
196. See Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that, although the parties may have conducted the
transaction in the United States, in economic reality, the transaction was more akin
to domestic plaintiffs buying foreign shares of a foreign company on a foreign
exchange), affd sub nom. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d 198.
197. See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 218 (Leval, J., concurring) (explaining how in
reaching its decision, the court considered how German authorities had already
investigated the fraud and that the case was pending before a German court).
198. Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 474, 476.
199. See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216 (noting that German regulatory authorities
and courts were already looking into the possible fraudulent acts of Porsche).
200. Id. at 205.
201. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Porsche Automobil Holding SE, supra note 164, at 33-34.
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finding the issuer liable under U.S. securities laws.202  The case
consisted of strong foreign elements.201 The new two-step
extraterritoriality test solves this issue by allowing courts to take
international comity into consideration through the economic reality
of the security and other factors.
2. The new two-step extrateritorial test will establish a balance between
flexible and bright-line rules
Finally, the new two-step extraterritorial test will reinforce
Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality by creating a
balance between flexible and bright-line rules. Courts do not want to
create a Barbary Coast where fraudsters easily find loopholes for rigid
bright-line rules, but courts also do not want to create a Shangri-La where
plaintiffs flock to U.S. courts to use an overly flexible rule.204 Although
courts previously considered Morrison's transactional test as a bright-line
rule,205 the Second Circuit in Pahcentral held the transactional test was
necessary but not sufficient for courts to find § 10(b) applicable.'
The new extraterritorial test maintains a level of predictability
because the test keeps as its first step the bright-line transactional test
of Morrison. The transactional test incorporates the Exchange Act's
focus on the purchase and sale of securities inside the United
States.207 Under the transactional test, courts and parties know that
the security transaction must relate to a security listed on a domestic
exchange or a domestic transaction in another security for § 10(b) to
apply." The previous test used by courts, the conduct-and-effects
test, did not have the same level of predictability."' One factor
persuading a court to decide that § 10(b) applies in a given case
might not persuade another court to decide the same way in another
202. See Parkcentra 763 F.3d at 215; Brief of Defendant-Appellee Porsche
Automobil Holding SE, supra note 164, at 24.
203. Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216.
204. Morrison v. Nat'l AustI. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010).
205. Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645
F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (characterizing Morrison as adopting a
bright-line test); Calfee, supra note 13, at 154 (same); Second Circuit Holds Transactions
Domestic, supra note 5, at 1430 (same).
206. Parkcentrat, 763 F.3d at 215-16.
207. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-67.
208. See id. at 266; Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 215-16.
209. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255-56, 258-59 (criticizing, for instance, how courts
analyzed the conduct portion of the test differently depending on whether the
investors were American or foreign).
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case.20 The Supreme Court in Morrison lambasted the lower courts
for not consistently applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality.2 1' However, now under the transactional test,
courts maintain the presumption by requiring cases to have the
transaction location based in the United States.212
Yet, if a court only uses the transactional test, it may end up
applying § 10(b) even though the transaction is impermissibly
extraterritorial; this is inconsistent with Morrison." In the current
dynamic financial market, there is constant innovation using the
latest technology to create new security instruments.21' Transaction
location is important, as it is the focus of the Exchange Act's
provision.2 1' However, transaction location is increasingly less
determinative of whether a security is domestic or foreign.21 ' For
instance, using only Morrison's transactional test, parties to swap
agreements where the underlying security is traded solely on a
foreign exchange would be able to sue foreign companies in U.S.
courts as long as they conducted the swap in the United States.1
The defendants may not have been aware of the swap agreement or
even have any connection to U.S. markets, besides third parties using
their company's security as the base of their contract price. In
contrast, the sufficiency portion of the two-step extraterritorial test
provides courts with a flexible method to analyze whether, despite its
transaction location, a transaction is sufficiently domestic. The
various factors of the test will allow courts to address whether the
foreign factors of the case overwhelm the domestic transaction.
210. See id. (same).
211. Id. at 255-56.
212. See id. at 266-67 (proffering the transactional test).
213. Second Circuit Holds Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at 1433 (noting that
the location-based focus of the Supreme Court's test can lead to issues because
"transactional location is of increasingly limited value").
214. See Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
217 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (declining to proffer a specific sufficiency test because in
a case of first impression, the court was not equipped to create a test that could easily be
applied to the various types of current security instruments and those yet to be created).
215. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266, 272 (arguing that the focus of the Exchange Act is not
on fraud, but fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security in the United States).
216. See Chambers, supra note 146, at 427 (remarking that courts will struggle with
determining the location of swap transactions for Morrison); Second Circuit Holds
Transactions Domestic, supra note 5, at 1436 (finding this trend in the case of securities-
based swap agreements, over-the-counter securities, and American Depository Receipts).
217. See Chambers, supra note 146, at 427-28 (remarking that the court in Elliott Associates
reached the correct outcome but with faulty reasoning); Painter, supra note 178, at 5-8.
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The new extraterritorial test should be a two-step test consisting of
Morrison's transactional test and a subsequent factor-based sufficiency
test. The economic reality method will be one of the factors of the
sufficiency test. By including the economic reality method in the
extraterritorial test, courts can more effectively apply Morrison to a
variety of security instruments. The new two-step extraterritorial test
will strengthen Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality by
giving courts more tools to evaluate the foreign elements of cases.
Courts can address international comity concerns through the
economic reality method and the totality of the circumstances
framework. Additionally, the new extraterritorial test strengthens the
presumption by establishing a balance between flexible and bright-
line rules. This combines the predictable transactional test under
Morrison with the more flexible sufficiency test, allowing courts to
ensure that § 10(b) is not still applied to cases that are impermissibly
extraterritorial despite their transaction location.
CONCLUSION
After Parkcentral, courts have an opportunity to find a halfway point
between the Barbary Coast and Shangri-La. Under the conduct-and-
effects test, U.S. courts functioned too much like a Shangri-La where
foreign plaintiffs used U.S. courts despite their cases having little
actual connection to the United States."' The Supreme Court with
Morrison tried to shift the balance back with the transactional test.219
However, the test's singular focus on transaction location in the
increasingly globalized and technically-advanced markets went too far
in the other direction.220  Thereafter, the Second Circuit in
Parkcentral added some flexibility into the inquiry with the addition of
a sufficiency test.221 Courts using the second sufficiency test, with the
economic reality method as one of the factors, will help U.S. courts
keep the integrity of the court system while still having the tools to
adequately prosecute U.S. securities law violators.
218. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255-56, 258-59 (criticizing, for instance, how courts
analyzed the conduct portion of the test differently depending on whether the
investors were American or foreign).
219. See id. at 267, 269-70 (outlining two factors for determining liability: (1)
whether the transaction is conducted in the United States, or (2) whether it involves
a security listed on a domestic exchange).
220. See supra Part I.A.5.
221. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
215-16 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
467
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Accordingly, courts will first perform the Morrison transactional
test. Courts will look at whether the case involves a security "listed on
domestic exchange[]" or a "domestic transaction[] in other
securities."' If the case fails either of these tests then the court can
dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6).2 If
the case passes the transactional test, the court will then move on to
the sufficiency test. In the sufficiency test, the court will look beyond
the transaction location and examine the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether § 10(b) applies. The sufficiency
test is not a return to the conduct-and-effects test because it is
positioned in a different place in the inquiry.224 The sufficiency test is
part of the analysis to determine whether a transaction is sufficiently
domestic to warrant § 10(b) liability.2 25
The economic reality method is still viable after the Second
Circuit's decision in Parkcentral. The Second Circuit did not
specifically overrule the method employed by the district court.
Moreover, courts have long used economic reality to determine
whether unique security instruments fall under the securities laws.2
However, the district court in Elliott Associates was incorrect in using
the economic reality method as part of the transactional test.2 2 7
Courts should instead use the economic reality method as one of the
factors in the sufficiency test. The inclusion of the economic reality
method in the extraterritorial framework will allow courts to more
effectively apply Morrison to a variety of security instruments.
The new two-step extraterritorial test will help courts maintain
Morrison's strong presumption against extraterritoriality. Although
the Morrison Court developed the transactional test to facilitate this
inquiry, the test's singular focus on the location of the transaction
can hinder maintenance of the presumption against
extraterritoriality in some instances. The test advocated by this
Comment will strengthen Morrison's presumption against
222. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
223. See id. at 254 (noting that the extraterritorial analysis was a merits question;
thus, dismissal of these cases would be under Rule 12(b) (6) and not Rule 12(b) (1)).
224. See supra Part II.A.2.
225. But cf Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1337
(2d Cir. 1972) (asking whether Congress would have wanted § 10(b) to apply to a
case with such foreign elements), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247.
226. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975); Elliott
Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd
sub nom. Parkcentra4 763 F.3d 198.
227. Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
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extraterritoriality by providing courts with more tools to analyze cases
with foreign elements. Courts can address international comity
concerns through the economic reality method and the totality of the
circumstances framework. Additionally, the new extraterritorial test
strengthens the presumption by establishing a balance between
flexible and bright-line rules.

